Policy Core Information Model -- Version 1 Specification

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RFC 3060             Policy Core Information Model         February 2001


   Even though specific security requirements are not appropriate for
   PCIM, specific security requirements MUST be defined for each
   operational real- world application of PCIM.  Just as there will be a
   wide range of operational, real-world systems using PCIM, there will
   also be a wide range of security requirements for these systems.
   Some operational, real-world systems that are deployed using PCIM may
   have extensive security requirements that impact nearly all classes
   and subclasses utilized by such a system, while other systems'
   security requirements might have very little impact.

   The derivative documents, discussed above, will create the context
   for applying operational, real-world, system-level security
   requirements against the various models which derive from PCIM.

   For example, in some real-world scenarios, the values associated with
   certain properties, within certain instantiated classes, may
   represent information associated with scarce, and/or costly (and
   therefore valuable) resources.  It may be the case that these values
   must not be disclosed to, or manipulated by, unauthorized parties.
   As long as the derived model remains an information model (as opposed
   to a data model), it is not possible to discuss the data model-
   specific tools and mechanisms that are available for achieving the
   authentication and authorization implicit in a requirement that
   restricts read and/or read- write access to these values.  Therefore,
   these mechanisms will need to be discussed in each of the data models
   to which the derived information models are mapped.  If there are any
   general security requirements that can be identified and can be
   applied across multiple types of data models, it would be appropriate
   to discuss those at the information model level, rather than the data
   model level.  In any case, any identified security requirements that
   are not dealt with in the information model document, MUST be dealt
   with in the derivative data model documents.

   We can illustrate these points by extending the example from Section
   2.  A real-world system that provides QoS Gold Service to John would
   likely need to provide at least the following security-related
   capabilities and mechanisms (see [12] for definitions of security
   related terms):

   o  Data integrity for the information (e.g., property values and
      instantiated relationships) that specify that John gets QoS Gold
      Service, from the point(s) that the information is entered into
      the system to the point(s) where network components actually
      provide that Service.

   o  Authentication and Authorization methods to ensure that only
      system administrators (and not John or other engineers) can
      remotely administer components of the system.



Moore, et al.               Standards Track                    [Page 61]